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I. Introduction
Output growth is determined by growth in labor productivity and growth 
in labor input. Over the past two decades, technological developments 
have changed how many economists think about growth in labor pro-
ductivity. However, in the coming decades, the aging of the population 
will change how economists think about the growth in labor input in 
the United States. As the oldest baby boomers born in 1946 turned 50, 
then 55, and then 60, an important economic change has slowly sur-
faced: these people have become less likely to participate in the labor 
force. While this shift was obscured by a labor market slump in 2002, the 
aging of the American population began to put downward pressure on 
aggregate labor supply, marking the start of what is likely to be a sharp 
deceleration in labor input that will last another half-century. 
Beginning in the mid-1960s, movements in women’s labor force partic-
ipation dominated all other inﬂ  uences, pushing up aggregate labor force 
participation rates sharply over the 25 years since 1965, until leveling 
off after about 1990. From 1963 to 1991, the average annual growth in 
the U.S. labor force was 2 percent a year. In coming years, the dominant 
inﬂ  uence will likely be the evolution of the population’s age distribution. 
The Social Security Administration projects labor force growth will slow 
to 0.5 percent a year by 2015 and to 0.3 percent a year by 20251—a strik-
ing deceleration from the aforementioned 2 percent annual pace. Since 
1995 the population bulge then comprising people in their 30s has moved 
on to older age groups that are associated with lower labor force partici-
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of older Americans, the shift of the population distribution away from 
prime working-age adults will put signiﬁ  cant downward pressure on the 
nation’s labor force participation rate. In fact, absent other changes, the 
aging of the U.S. population has the potential to undo the increases in 
participation rates brought about earlier by the increased entry of women 
into the labor force. 
Estimates of labor supply growth also depend partly on uncertain 
population projections. Both the U.S. Census Bureau (Census Bureau) 
and the Social Security Administration project that growth in the popula-
tion aged 16 years and over will slow to about 1 percent in 2009, from 
the 2005 pace of approximately 1.2 percent. However, there are subtle 
differences in these two projections that, combined with differing par-
ticipation rate projections, act to widen the differences between various 
projections for aggregate labor supply growth.
As the changes in the U.S. age distribution and population growth 
unfold, it is unclear how the within-group trends will adapt to offset—or 
perhaps evolve to exacerbate—the declines induced by the aging of the 
population. In the last ﬁ  ve years, in fact, within-group trends appear to 
have mostly exacerbated the decline in labor force participation.2 Even 
abstracting from how within-group participation rates have evolved in 
recent years, the shifts in the age distribution have lowered the labor force 
participation rate by nearly 0.4 percentage points between 2002:Q4 and 
2006:Q4.3 Going forward, however, the within-group changes in partici-
pation rates are the crucial element in determining the extent to which 
U.S. population aging may depress aggregate labor force participation.
A population-weighted average of individual age group participation 
rates indicates that aging has lowered aggregate U.S. labor force par-
ticipation during the 2002–2006 period. However, the level of the labor 
force rose 1.8 percent between December 2005 and December 2006, as 
the participation rate moved up from 66.0 percent to 66.4 percent. Yet 
in 2007:Q2, the labor force participation rate fell back to an average of 
66.0 percent. Where labor supply is headed has, accordingly, become 
the subject of some debate. The question has spawned a small literature 
seeking to separate trend developments from cyclical responses, and to 
understand what the future course of labor supply might be.4 
A number of uncertainties currently cloud this debate. For example, 
when discussing a paper on labor supply presented by the current authors 
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and others at a recent Brookings Institution panel, members of the panel 
suggested that participation rate projections might be highly sensitive to 
assumptions about the future course of immigration, and that govern-
ment projections often do not include illegal immigrants in population 
estimates. As will be explained in more detail below, this assertion is not 
quite correct, and immigration has more inﬂ  uence on population growth 
and measures such as the dependency ratio than does the labor force 
participation rate. 
To try to answer some of these questions, this paper seeks to docu-
ment a number of the features of various labor force projections made 
by different federal agencies, and to evaluate the importance of various 
assumptions to those projections in order to focus subsequent research 
on where the most important uncertainties lie.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the shifts underway 
in the nation’s age distribution, and how this change relates directly to 
the labor force participation rate. The inﬂ  uence of two key assumptions 
underlying U.S. population projections, life expectancy and immigra-
tion, is discussed in section III. Section IV discusses within-age-sex-group 
trends from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the Social Security Admin-
istration, and the predictions of a cohort-based model of participation 
developed by the authors. This model identiﬁ  es birth cohorts’ propen-
sities to participate in the labor force, and explicitly incorporates the 
changing population shares.5 Section V cautions that we do not yet know 
how policy may ultimately respond to the coming changes, and section 
VI summarizes our main points. 
II.  How Population Shifts Inﬂ  uence Labor Force Participation
The reason that U.S. population aging has the potential to drastically slow 
labor supply growth is because labor force participation rates decline 
precipitously after age 50 for both men and women. Thus as the aging 
baby boomers move into their 60s, and as life expectancies continue to 
lengthen, the rising population share of older Americans has the potential 
to lower the share of Americans who are working or looking for work. 
For example, by 2035 the share of the adult population aged 80 years or 
more is expected to double to approximately 15 percent, and 97 percent 
of this age group currently does not participate in the labor force. The The Outlook for Labor Supply in the United States 34
future downward pressure on participation rates is primarily a result of 
these two forces—the aging of the baby boomers and longer life expec-
tancies—now pushing in the same direction, after many years in which 
the upward pressure of the baby boomers moving into high participation 
rate ages offset the downward pressure from longer life expectancies on 
labor supply.
Figure 2.1 shows the age proﬁ  les of U.S. labor force participation rates 
for men and women using 2005 annual averages for 14 age categories, 
and the aggregate participation rate for reference.6 Among women, those 
over 55 years of age have below-average labor force participation rates. 
Among men, the age groups over 60 years of age have below-average 
labor force participation rates. Historically the age proﬁ  le for men has 
remained relatively stable, although among women, in particular those 
above 20 years of age, participation rates have risen during the postwar 
period. These various age proﬁ  les capture an important feature of labor 
supply—although within-age participation rates among older age groups 
Figure 2.1 
U.S. Labor Force Participation Rates by Age, 2005 (Annual Averages)
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may rise and fall, individuals in their 60s are much less likely to partici-
pate in the workforce than individuals in their 50s, and individuals in 
their 70s are much less likely to participate than individuals in their 60s. 
In short, after age 50, labor supply is a declining function of age. 
Whether this lower supply arises due to failing health, disability, having 
adequate wealth, or retirement income, it is a feature of life-cycle labor 
supply unlikely to change fundamentally in the next few decades. While 
the ﬁ  rst derivative of this function may change, it is quite likely to remain 
negative. 
Figure 2.2 shows some historical and projected population shares 
of the age 16 and over Civilian Non-Institutional Population (CNIP), 
taken from the Current Population Survey, and grown out by the Census 
Bureau’s population projections. The combination of rising life expec-
tancy and the aging of the baby boom generation is dramatically pushing 
up the population share of older Americans. Around 2002, the share of 
individuals aged 55 years and older began to grow, while at the same time 
the share aged 35–44 years was shrinking. In 2006, the share of the age 
groups over 65 years old has begun to rise, and this increase will acceler-
ate around 2010, with the share growing until around 2030.
Figure 2.2 highlights the fact that that the baby boomers are a bulge 
generation. As they leave high participation rate age groups, the cohorts 
behind the boomers are relatively small. In 1946 the U.S. fertility 
rate—deﬁ  ned as the number of live births per 1,000 women aged 15–44 
years—leapt by nearly 20 percent, an unprecedented jump. The fertility 
rate rose another 10 percent in 1947. However, after peaking in 1957, 
fertility declined steadily and by 1966 had fallen back to levels seen dur-
ing World War II. By 1973 the fertility rate had fallen to a level that at the 
time was the lowest recorded by the ofﬁ  cial U.S. statistics begun in 1909. 
The result of this fertility decline is that while the baby boomers grow 
older, the U.S. population in the highest labor force participation rate age 
groups is falling. In fact, the level of the CNIP of 30-34-year-old men, the 
highest participating age-sex group, has had outright declines since 2003, 
according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The implications of these demographic shifts for future labor force 
participation are striking. Figure 2.3 shows the history of the actual labor 
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2040 that uses the 2005 labor force participation rate for each age group 
and allows the population shares to evolve as forecast by the Census 
projections. Although other starting years can produce mildly different 
patterns, the implications are essentially the same: absent other changes, 
projected U.S. population aging will lower the aggregate labor force par-
ticipation rate by 6 full percentage points over the next 35 years. This 
pace of decline dwarfs the 0.4 percentage point decline in aggregate labor 
force participation that shifting population shares have engendered over 
the past four years. In addition, using 2005 as a base year incorporates 
recent increases in older Americans’ participation rates; the inﬂ  uence of 
aging would be a bit larger say, if we used year 2000 participation rates. 
In sum, the projected aging of the labor force is likely to have a sizeable 
inﬂ  uence on participation rates, with the potential to completely unwind 
the increases in participation attributable to the entry of more women 
in the workforce that began in the mid-1960s, accelerated sharply until 
1990, and has since then leveled off.
The extent to which this decline shall materialize will depend on two 
inputs to the calculation: the projection for population shares, and the 
projections for within-age-group participation rates. We discuss each of 
these in turn.
III. Population  Projections
Two government agencies are primarily responsible for U.S. population 
projections, and the projections’ underlying assumptions overlap sub-
stantially. The primary agency is the Census Bureau, but the Social Secu-
rity Administration produces independent estimates of population levels 
and growth. The primary difference between the two agencies’ popula-
tion projections is due to assumptions about net international migration, 
including undocumented immigration. However, in recent years impor-
tant differences have arisen in the agencies’ estimates for the population 
share of Americans over age 65.
The U.S. Census Bureau, of course, conducts the decennial census. In 
between these ofﬁ  cial censuses, which are essentially a benchmark, the 
agency produces estimates that update how many people are living in the 
United States, based on a variety of sources ranging from the National 
Center for Health Statistics to the Department of Defense; these updates 
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incorporate estimates from surveys such as the American Community 
Survey. The Census Bureau’s updated estimates appear in the published 
reports from the Current Population Survey. Despite the Census Bureau’s 
best efforts, these estimates can be off substantially. For example, the 
estimate of the national population from the 2000 decennial census was 
6.8 million individuals more than the pre-decennial census estimates. Of 
that gap’s discrepancy, 4 million was due to improved methodological 
reductions in undercounting, which would have raised pre-census esti-
mates had the method been applied to the 1990 census. Only 2.8 million 
of the discrepancy was due to underestimated population growth, dispro-
portionately Hispanic, which appears attributable to underestimating net 
international migration.7
While the Census Bureau’s estimates are backward looking, and pro-
vide the nation’s best estimate of the population at any given point in 
history, it also produces forward-looking projections. Based on the size 
of cohorts, assumptions for fertility rates, estimated death rates, and 
assumptions for net international migration, levels of the population at 
each age are projected out to 2050.8 Similarly, the Social Security Admin-
istration produces its own projections, while using the Census Bureau’s 
historical estimates.
However, the two agencies’ assumptions have different implications 
for how the U.S. population is distributed across various age groups, and 
thus each agency’s projection implies a different degree of downward 
pressure on the aggregate labor force participation rate. Although both 
the popular media and labor researchers tend to focus on how immigra-
tion may affect the future labor supply, the key difference for the U.S. 
labor supply outlook is the varying projections for longevity—in particu-
lar the life expectancy of older American women. Figure 2.4 shows the 
population shares of several age groups of men and women in the Cur-
rent Population Survey estimates and in the Social Security Administra-
tion projections for 2005. The most notable difference is that the Social 
Security Administration predicted a lower share of women over age 65 
than did the Census estimates, although the Census estimates were based 
on more recent source data.9 
Figure 2.5 compares the implications of this difference for projections 
of the labor force participation rate. For this exercise we use the published 
Bureau of Labor Statistics’ participation rates within age groups, so the The Outlook for Labor Supply in the United States 40
differences in the aggregate participation rates derive solely from differ-
ences in population shares. The solid line uses the current Census Bureau 
estimates of population shares in 2005 grown out by census projections 
for population shares going forward, while the dashed line uses the Social 
Security Administration’s projections for the population shares. The pace 
of decline in the two projections is quite similar, which is not surprising, 
as both agencies rely mostly on current death tables for projecting future 
life expectancy and the immigration assumptions are relatively similar. 
An important part of the level gap reﬂ  ects the Social Security Adminis-
tration projections’ smaller assumed labor market share of women over 
age 65, a group which has a particularly low participation rate, and the 
extrapolation of this difference. 
This comparative exercise points to a particular downside risk to labor 
force participation rate projections. To the extent that most estimates 
Figure 2.4 
U.S. Population Distributions by Age, 2005: U.S. Census Bureau’s Current 
Population Survey versus U.S. Social Security Administration Estimates
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of future life expectancy are based on current death rates, little adjust-
ment is made for continued reductions in mortality rates.10 To provide a 
sense of the magnitude of this risk, we adjusted the population growth 
of females aged 70 years and over from what is actually predicted by 
the Census Bureau projections. The change we made was to essentially 
simulate a shock to mortality rates for this age group. Deaths per person 
per year among all Americans age 65 years and over declined from nearly 
0.1 in the years prior to World War II, down to nearly 0.05 by 2000.11 
For our counterfactual simulation we lower the projected path of deaths 
per person in the Census Bureau projections for females age 70 years 
and over by 0.01 in 2006 and every year thereafter. Note that by adjust-
ing the rate of exit from the population, the population growth rate is 
boosted every year, which has a cumulative effect over time because the 
lower outﬂ  ows raise the number of women aged 70 years and over who 
survive from year to year. The result of this counterfactual simulation is 
shown in Figure 2.6. In this scenario, by 2040 the downward pressure on 
Figure 2.5 
Projected U.S. Labor Force Participation Rates, 2005–2040: Census 
Bureau Population Shares versus Social Security Administration Estimates
Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Census Bureau, and U.S. Social 
Security Administration.
Note: Participation rates are calculated using published U.S. Bureau of 
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the aggregate participation rate would be an additional 2.5 percentage 
points.
While continued reductions in mortality pose a downside risk to pro-
jections of the aggregate labor force participation rate, increases in immi-
gration would likely pose an upside risk because immigrants are more 
likely to be in younger age groups with higher labor force participation 
rates, and are arguably more likely to participate even within older age 
groups (see Figure 2.7 for an example of the variation in participation 
across racial/ethnic groups).12 
Much of the issue with immigration is one of measurement. For exam-
ple, based largely on discrepancies between employment estimates from 
the Current Population Survey and the Current Employment Statistics 
program, many analysts argued that the Census Bureau has overestimated 
population growth, and in particular has overestimated net international 
migration since the 2000 census. If, indeed, the Census Bureau has over-
estimated net international migration, that may imply that the current 
level of the aggregate participation rate is overstated. And if the Census 
Figure 2.6 
The Impact of Reduced Female Mortality Rates on Projected U.S. Labor 
Force Participation Rates, 2005–2040
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Bureau projections for population growth also overestimate future net 
international migration, this may represent a downside risk to the projec-
tions for the U.S. aggregate labor force participation rate. 
Undocumented immigration is the most difﬁ  cult component of net 
international migration to measure. Accordingly, estimates of the number 
of undocumented immigrants vary widely, but the most recent estimates 
from the Pew Hispanic Center put the number of undocumented immi-
grants in the United States in 2006 at about 12 million—a ﬁ  gure consis-
tent with the estimates in the Current Population Survey.13 Of those 12 
million undocumented immigrants, 49 percent are estimated to be male, 
35 percent female, and 16 percent children. As to the total inﬂ  ow of doc-
umented and undocumented immigrants, the Census Bureau estimated 
that total net immigration in 2005 was 1.2 million. The Social Security 
Administration, in its intermediate assumptions, assumes total net immi-
gration in 2005 of 1.075 million. The Social Security Administration 
projects that total net immigration will decrease to 1 million annually by 
2010 and to 900,000 annually by 2030. Alternatively, the Census Bureau 
projects total net immigration of 770,000 for 2010, and 1,161,000 for 
Figure 2.7 
2005 U.S. Labor Force Participation Rate, Ages 25 to 54 Years, by Race 
and Gender
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2030, both of which are upward revisions from earlier assumptions after 
taking on board the data from the 2000 decennial census. 
Of course, what will actually happen to U.S. net immigration 20 years 
from now is anyone’s guess. However, compared to the inﬂ  uence of the 
aging of the population, immigration will have little inﬂ  uence on the 
aggregate added “immigrants” to the male 30-34-year-old age group—
the age group with the highest labor force participation rate.14 First, we 
added 100,000 of these high-participation persons each year from 2000 
onward. This is represented as assumption (1) in Figure 2.8. Second, we 
added 200,000 per year, for an extra million (compared with an estimated 
stock of about 12 million) by 2006.15 This is assumption (2) in ﬁ  gure 
2.8. This alternative would be roughly similar to the high series nonle-
gal immigration assumption by the Social Security Administration, but 
represents a 50 percent increase over their intermediate assumption. Of 
course, the Social Security Administration would not likely assume that 
all those added immigrants would be 30-34-year-old men. In addition, 
we assume that even as they age, these male immigrants will maintain the 
Figure 2.8 
The Effect of Immigration Assumptions on Projected U.S. Labor Force 
Participation Rates, 2005–2040
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participation rates of current 30-34-year-old men, so our experiment rep-
resents something of an upper bound on the effect greater immigration 
may have on future labor force participation rates in the United States.
As Figure 2.8 shows, the accumulated extra immigration after the 
2005 stepping-off point makes little difference to the aggregate U.S. labor 
force participation rate. And even under the extreme assumption that 
all these immigrants will be 30-34-year-old men, the continued higher 
level of immigration does relatively little to slow the pace of decline in 
the aggregate participation rate implied by the aging of the baby boom 
and longer life expectancy: immigration adds back only 1 percentage 
point to the 6.5-point decline in labor force participation rates due to 
population aging. The intuition for this muted response is that adding an 
immigrant to the numerator of the participation rate also adds someone 
to the denominator, while a retiring baby boomer removes an individual 
from the numerator but does not change the denominator. To completely 
offset the effects of aging on future labor force participation rates would 
require the United States to add well over 1 million 30-34-year-old males 
annually to population in the coming years, and for those immigrants to 
maintain that high 30–34-year-old participation rate even as they age.
The role of immigration leads to the question of whether one is pri-
marily interested in the labor force participation rate, or in the over-
all labor supply. The participation rate is only one component of labor 
supply, the other two being population growth and hours worked. For 
example, the downside risk to the participation rate posed by increased 
life expectancy would largely be offset by the corresponding increase 
in population growth when computing labor supply. In addition, while 
immigration does not have a large inﬂ  uence on the labor force partici-
pation rate, rising population growth translates into more labor supply 
growth and means more for measures like the dependency ratio, which 
are arguably more important to policy. In our experiments, while labor 
force participation may continue to decline, the population aged 16 years 
and over is boosted by more immigration. Despite the projected declines 
in participation rates, immigration could increase the size of the popula-
tion enough that the U.S. labor force grows. However, even the annual 
addition of the aforementioned 200,000 immigrants to the level of the 
population would currently be just a 0.1 percentage point increase in the The Outlook for Labor Supply in the United States 46
population growth rate, a small offset when the Social Security Adminis-
tration is projecting labor supply growth to decrease to 0.5 percent a year 
in the next eight years. 
IV.  Projecting Trends in Within-Group Participation Rates
Comparing the implications for the participation rate of the Census 
Bureau projections and the Social Security Administration projections, 
as shown in Figure 2.5, indicates a certain amount of consensus among 
government forecasters for the direct future effects of population aging 
on aggregate labor force participation. Although there is uncertainty in 
these projections concerning primarily the outlook for U.S. immigration 
policy and U.S. life expectancies, the current consensus is that population 
aging will place substantial downward pressure on labor force participa-
tion rates, as both sets of population projections imply a decline of more 
than 6 percentage points over the next 30 years. How reality unfolds, of 
course, depends on how individuals and others respond to the changing 
circumstances. That is, while it seems likely that the baby boomers will 
age, and that life expectancies will continue to rise, what is less clear is 
how many people will, in the future, choose to work at any given age.
In this section of the paper we rely on three different projections of 
labor force participation rates. The Bureau of Labor Statistics and the 
Social Security Administration produce regularly updated projections of 
participation rates, not only for the aggregate labor supply, but within 
narrow age and gender categories. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ projec-
tions rely on time-series extrapolations of the recent trends within nar-
row demographic groups. The Social Security Administration combines 
model-based predictions, estimates of policy effects, and observations of 
the lagged behavior of birth cohorts, as well as judgmental adjustments 
to their projections. 
In addition to the projections of these two agencies, we also consider 
the projections of a model we designed that relies on cohort effects in 
order to predict the future path of participation for individual birth years. 
Our model contains cyclical controls and variables representing educa-
tion, fertility, and socioeconomic trends, as well as the features of govern-
ment transfer programs, all of which are detailed in related papers we 
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have written. The model is estimated for men and women separately, and 
produces a trend-cycle decomposition for labor force participation rates 
in 28 age-gender demographic groups that are aggregated by population 
weights. With some assumptions for the future path of the policy and 
sociodemographic variables, the model can be used to produce projec-
tions of the participation rate trend.16 Each method is complicated enough 
to warrant long separate literatures, but comparing their outcomes high-
lights important risks to the projections for future labor supply.17 
One important question for projecting future trends is whether people 
in older age groups will begin to work more than they have in the past. 
This change in behavior may follow from better health at older ages, 
more years of expected life to ﬁ  nance after age 65, changes in retire-
ment preferences, or inducements to stay in the workforce provided by 
business or government. The popular press has questioned whether the 
baby boomers may keep on working past age 65, despite the fact that at 
younger ages, male baby boomers have tended to work less than the male 
cohorts who preceded them; see Figure 2.9.
Figure 2.9 
U.S. Labor Force Participation Rates for Men Aged 65 Years and Older, 
1977–2017
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Among the forecasts produced by U.S. government agencies, most are 
in agreement that the labor force participation rates of older age groups 
will rise in the coming years. The participation rates for men aged 65 
years and over and for women aged 65 and over are shown as the solid 
lines in Figures 2.9 and 2.10, respectively. The age group comprising 
those aged 65 years and older has increased its labor force participation 
markedly over the past decade. This increase, which is taking place in 
one of the fastest growing components of the U.S. population, has the 
potential to offset some of the declines in participation due to the shifts 
in population share.
Both Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show the historical data, the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ “full-employment” projections, the Social Security Administra-
tion projection, and the projected trend from our own (Fallick-Pingle) 
cohort-based model. For men aged 65 years and over, all three forecasts 
are rising, with the Fallick-Pingle estimates roughly in line with the Social 
Security Administration projections. The Bureau of Labor Statistics’ pro-
Figure 2.10 
U.S. Labor Force Participation Rates for Women Aged 65 Years and Older, 
1977–2017
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jections—an extrapolation of the preceding years’ growth rates—point 
to much faster growth. In the Fallick-Pingle model the increases are 
attributable to a combination of longer life expectancies, higher educa-
tion among the cohorts reaching these ages, and favorable Social Security 
incentives, speciﬁ  cally, the rising retirement age and the increases in the 
delayed retirement credit, which encourage older adults to remain in the 
workforce.
For women aged 65 years and over, the qualitative aspects of the fore-
casts are quite similar. The Fallick-Pingle trend estimates have a slightly 
steeper trajectory than other forecasts. In this model, these increases are 
largely due to female cohorts that are highly attached to the labor force—
the same women who from 1970 to 1990 raised the prime-age female 
labor supply—ﬁ  lling up this older age category. All three of the fore-
casts expect participation rates for this demographic group will continue 
to rise rapidly. If we look at the rough estimates, all of the projections 
expect gains of nearly 0.5 percentage points per year in this group’s par-
ticipation rate. The share of women aged 65 years and over is expected to 
increase from 9 percent to 10 percent of the population over this projec-
tion horizon, to 2015. Roughly speaking, this implies this demographic 
group alone would add nearly 0.05 percentage points to the aggregate 
labor force participation rate per year. As shown in Figure 2.5, the pro-
jected pace of decline due to population aging is roughly 0.2 percentage 
points per year, on average, between 2005 and 2040. Thus, the increased 
labor force participation among older women projected by all three fore-
casts would offset roughly one-quarter of that decline over the period 
shown in the model projections.18
Where the various forecasts begin to diverge is among prime-age 
workers, those who are 25-54-years-old. This divergence is particularly 
important because prime-age men and women represent more than half 
of the population aged 16 years and over —a large weight in any aggre-
gation. Figure 2.11 shows the historical data for prime-age men, and 
the forecasts for their continued labor force participation. This group’s 
participation rate has declined steadily for nearly the entire postwar 
period, although the data shown begins only in 1977. Not foreseeing any 
reason for those declines to end, the Fallick-Pingle model extrapolates 
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Administration forecast, while in the coming years the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics projections expect slight increases in prime-age men’s labor 
force participation rates. This forecast amounts to a leveling off or rever-
sal of the data series’ recent history.
As shown in Figure 2.12, more pronounced differences emerge among 
the forecasts for prime-age females, as the Fallick-Pingle model projects 
declines that the two other forecasts do not. The Fallick-Pingle model 
anticipates that the participation rate of prime-age women has not only 
leveled off, but has begun to trend somewhat like prime-age men’s, with 
steady declines predicted in the years ahead. In contrast, the Social Secu-
rity Administration predicts prime-age women’s labor force participation 
will level off, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics projects increases that 
will eventually take prime-age women’s participation rate to levels not 
seen since the business cycle peak in 2000. Given the large share of the 
American population represented by the age group, this divergence for 
Figure 2.11 
U.S. Labor Force Participation Rates for Men Aged 25 to 54 Years, 
1977–2017
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predicting the future labor market behavior of prime-age women accounts 
for a large portion of the deviations in the aggregate forecasts.19
The intuition behind the Fallick-Pingle estimates stems from the 
observed behavior of female birth cohorts over time. Figure 2.13 shows 
the participation rates for three age groups of women, ages 35–44 years, 
45–54 years, and 55–64 years. However, instead of using the year of 
observation on the horizontal axis, the ﬁ  gure uses the birth-year cohort. 
As the dotted line shows, the participation of women aged 35–44 years, 
leveled off starting with the 1949 or 1950 birth cohort. Similarly, the 
participation rate of the next age group, women aged 45–54 years, also 
leveled off when the women born around 1949 or 1950 were in that 
age group (there are similar changes in slope in earlier periods which, 
although not shown, line up also). Thus, the pattern of a birth cohort’s 
strong or weak labor force attachment earlier in life appears to inﬂ  u-
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53 Bruce Fallick and Jonathan Pingle
1957 through 1966, labor force attachment has declined from cohort to 
cohort, and the model carries this pattern forward. In essence, prime-age 
women have begun to behave similarly to prime-age men, whose labor 
supply has been trending down, on balance, for much of the postwar 
period. As of this writing, the labor force participation rate of women 
aged 25–54 years remains nearly 2 percentage points below the levels 
reached in 1997.
Although teenagers comprise only 7 percent of the U.S. population 
aged 16 years and over, the recent declines in their labor force partici-
pation rates have been particularly vexing to observers.20 Figure 2.14 
shows the teenage labor force participation rate, combined for males 
and females. Although trending down for some time, teenage labor force 
participation dropped precipitously following the 2001 business cycle 
peak, and has failed to increase even after a few years of labor market 
recovery. This decline is poorly explained by cyclical controls, and is not 
fully explained by changes in school enrollment, as a substantial amount 
of the decline occurred among individuals enrolled in school.21 A full 
Figure 2.14 
U.S. Labor Force Participation Rates for Teenagers, 1977–2017
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explanation of the labor market behavior of American teenagers remains 
a topic of ongoing research.
After aggregating the various components, the three forecasts for the 
aggregate U.S. labor force participation rate diverge noticeably—largely 
due to the differing assumptions made for the participation rates of 
prime-age workers; see Figure 2.15. 
The Fallick-Pingle trend is the lowest; this forecast relies on Census 
Bureau weights and carries forward declines in participation rates among 
prime-age men and women. The Social Security Administration fore-
cast starts with a higher level of participation among prime-age work-
ers, reﬂ  ecting the inﬂ  uence of an assumed smaller share of women over 
age 65. It also reﬂ  ects a cyclical rebound that is expected to result in a 
66.5 percent labor force participation rate for this group in 2007, then 
remains level, and then trends down beginning in 2009, although not 
quite at the pace predicted by the Fallick-Pingle model. This slower pace 
of decline in the Social Security Administration projections is in large 
part a function of the steep increases in teenage participation rates it has 
Figure 2.15 
U.S. Aggregate Labor Force Participation Rates, 1977–2017
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projected. Even the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates project aggregate 
labor force participation rates to edge lower in the coming years—see 
Table 2.1—despite robust increases forecast within nearly every age group 
(with the notable exception of teenagers) that will offset the downward 
pressures from population aging. However, as the Fallick-Pingle trend 
estimates show, even forecasts of strong increases in labor force partici-
pation among older age groups are not enough to offset the deeper inﬂ  u-
ence of population aging in the United States. Moreover, if the labor force 
participation rate for prime-age workers trends down, this age group’s 
behavior will exacerbate the declines in U.S. labor force participation 
rates due to population aging. 
V. Policy  Responses
The three projected forecasts for future U.S. labor force participation rates 
discussed thus far in this paper do not consider possible policy responses 
beyond those already enacted. As these currently stand, the Social Secu-
rity, Medicare, and private pension programs embed a long list of incen-
tives that inﬂ  uence the American labor supply. Large scale changes in old 
age programs in the United States have been rare, and policy can react 
with quite a lag to changing conditions. For example, the increase in U.S. 
women’s labor supply began in earnest in the early 1960s, but federal leg-
islation and even corporate responses to needs such as family leave, did 
not take hold until the early 1990s. However, within the United States, 
Table 2.1
Aggregate U.S. Labor Force Participation Rates (annual averages)
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income maintenance programs, family leave, and Social Security beneﬁ  t 
programs have all been changed by major federal legislation in the past, 
and will likely be changed in the future. Such changes could have major 
implications for future labor supply. 
Given the rising population share of older Americans, old-age programs 
are likely to be a particular focus of U.S. public policy in the coming 
years. There have been few substantive changes in these programs since 
the early 1980s. In 1983, the Greenspan Commission on Social Security 
reform suggested altering the program’s incentives on when to retire and 
ultimately the recommendations became law. Called the National Com-
mission on Social Security Reform, it was formed as Congress and the 
Reagan administration became worried that the Social Security system, 
facing a ﬁ  nancial crisis, might be insolvent by the middle of that decade. 
That fear, combined with the projected long-run deﬁ  cits expected with 
the retirement of the baby boomers, prompted Congressional action to 
encourage workers to delay receiving beneﬁ  ts (see Pingle 2006). 
Traditionally, Americans ﬁ  rst qualiﬁ  ed for Social Security beneﬁ  ts at 
age 62, and then qualiﬁ  ed for full beneﬁ  ts at age 65, termed the Normal 
Retirement Age (NRA), the age at which one qualiﬁ  es for their Primary 
Insurance Amount (PIA). The 1983 amendments raised the NRA gradu-
ally from 65 to 67, but this shift has begun only in the few most recent 
years. The legislation delayed the June 1983 cost-of-living increases. 
The amendments also changed the Retirement Earnings Test penalty for 
people turning age 65 in 1990 or later—reducing the penalty levied on 
Social Security payments/beneﬁ  ts from $1 of every $2 earned by people 
over an earned income limit, to $1 of every $3. Subsequently, in 1996 
new legislation raised the previous earned income limit, and in 2000 the 
Retirement Earnings Test was changed so that it only applies to people 
who are between 62 years of age and their NRA. 
The 1983 amendments substantially changed the Delayed Retirement 
Credit (DRC) beginning with the cohort born in 1925 turning 65 in 1990. 
The DRC raises an individual’s lifetime Social Security beneﬁ  ts for each 
month that he or she delays receiving their beneﬁ  ts after reaching their 
NRA—traditionally when someone turns 65. The DRC was instituted in 
1972 to provide a 1 percent bonus to a person’s remaining Social Secu-
rity pension to compensate for each year past age 65 a person delayed 
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receiving beneﬁ  ts, until age 70, in order to at least partially make up over 
time for the present value of the deferred beneﬁ  ts. The credit is applied in 
monthly increments so that past an eligible recipient’s 65th birthday, for 
each month during which beneﬁ  ts are not received, there is an upward 
adjustment in the lifetime amount of the monthly Social Security pay-
ment the individual eventually receives. The 1983 amendments increased 
the DRC from 1 percent to 3 percent. The new, higher levels of the DRC 
were assigned by the year an eligible worker was born. Under the new 
policy, the DRC rose from a 3 percent additional beneﬁ  t for those born 
in 1924 or earlier, in half-percent increments every two birth years, until 
the credit reaches 8 percent for individuals born in 1943 or later. Thus, 
the DRC increased for workers born in 1925 or later, in effect starting in 
1990 when that birth cohort turned 65. 
As shown in Figure 2.16, the rising levels of the DRC correspond 
closely to the increases in male labor supply among men in the affected age 
group. This increase bucks the trend towards lower labor force participa-
tion rates among younger men. Empirical estimates of the inﬂ  uence of the 
DRC are not the speciﬁ  c subject of this paper, although the Fallick-Pingle 
projections do include the policy as a right-hand-side variable. The point 
is that in the years ahead, this type of policy change might inﬂ  uence labor 
supply, and as-yet-unenacted policy changes have not been accounted for 
in any of the forward-looking estimates shown in this paper. Outside of 
Social Security, as the U.S. labor force ages ﬁ  rms may redesign workplace 
policies to attract and accommodate more senior employees. However, 
predicting such future responses is an essentially impossible task at the 
present time. It took 30 years after female labor force participation had 
begun climbing steeply in the early 1960s before comprehensive family 
leave legislation was enacted in the United States. How the future course 
of policy may eventually evolve is anybody’s guess.
VI. Conclusion
The rate at which individuals participate in the labor force declines pre-
cipitously beyond age 50. This behavioral feature of labor supply sug-
gests that ongoing shifts in the age distribution of the U.S. population 
have already begun to put substantial downward pressure on the nation’s 
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aggregate labor force participation rate. Although projections of such 
pressure in years to come rely on current projections for the evolution 
of the age distribution of the population—estimates which are sensitive 
to assumptions about future mortality rates and immigration—different 
population projections have relatively little inﬂ  uence on the degree of 
downward pressure aging will exert on the aggregate participation rate. 
Instead, the extent to which population aging will depress aggregate par-
ticipation rates in the U.S. labor force rests critically on how the partici-
pation rates within the various age groups evolve. In the end, however, 
substantial increases in participation rates across almost all age groups of 
both genders would be needed to completely offset the projected declines 
in labor force participation predicted over the next 30 years.
Unforeseen endogenous responses aside, the U.S. population is aging. 
The baby boomers are undoubtedly moving into lower participation rate 
age groups, relatively small younger cohorts are or will be moving into 
high participation rate age groups, and life expectancies are lengthening. 
While current labor market projections expect rising participation among 
older workers, a reasonable consensus is building that suggests U.S. labor 
supply has already slowed due to population aging and will slow further 
in the years ahead. The agreement among the three projections described 
in this paper is that the outlook is for slower growth in U.S. labor sup-
ply from 2007 onward than was the norm in the 1965–2000 period. 
Certainly, considering the information now in hand, the Social Security 
Administration’s projection for labor force growth to slow to 0.5 per-
cent a year by 2015, only seven years away, is a reasonable expectation, 
recognizing that there are reasonable scenarios that could lead to higher 
or lower growth rates. This is 25 percent of the pace observed from the 
three decades spanning the 1960s through the 1980s. How economists 
and U.S. policymakers build this general prediction into their thinking 
about the future performance of the macroeconomy is one of the most 
important research and public policy discussions on the contemporary 
research and policy agenda.
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Notes
1.  Social Security Administration 2007 Trustees Report.
2.  See Fallick and Pingle (2007) for more discussion of the recent history.
3. This computation can be seen by using the Current Population Survey data, 
holding the participation rates within age groups ﬁ  xed at their levels at some 
point in history and then allowing the actual population shares to evolve.
4. Bradbury (2005); Aaronson, Park, and Sullivan (2006); Aaronson, Rissman, 
and Sullivan (2004); and Toossi (2005).
5.  An earlier version of this model was used in Aaronson, Fallick, Figura, Pingle, 
and Wascher (2006).
6.  As shown in Fallick, Fleischman, and Pingle (2007), the declines do not depend 
on the base year chosen.
7.  See West and Robinson (2005). “Understanding Factors that Contributed to the 
Large Error of Closure in Census 2000, a note available online at: http://paa2005.
princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=51262
8. The Census Bureau’s population estimates are updated annually, while the 
Census Bureau’s projections are updated about twice a decade. Therefore, the 
Census Bureau’s projections for future population levels may not be consistent 
with its best current estimate of the historical population. This difference has 
implications for measuring labor force participation in real time, and highlights 
where some projection risks may lie. For example, the incoming population esti-
mates reﬂ  ected in the 2005 Current Population Survey population shares have 
more downward pressure on aggregate labor force participation than the share 
implied by the projections that the most recent Census Bureau estimates have 
superseded. Again, in January 2006, revisions to population estimates prompted 
revisions to the weights in the Current Population Survey, from which U.S. labor 
participation is ofﬁ   cially measured. The resulting new population estimates, 
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all else remaining the same, caused labor force participation rates to be revised 
downward by two hundredths of a percentage point. 
9. The data used in this paper that refer to Social Security Administration esti-
mates and projections refer to the data underlying the Social Security Administra-
tion 2006 Trustees Report, unless otherwise mentioned. 
10. According to Ward Kinkaide in the Census Bureau’s population projections 
branch, one reason for little extrapolation of life expectancy by birth cohort is 
because the data for many of cohorts born early in the century are of poor qual-
ity, thus limiting the ability to assemble a long time series of full-age-span life 
tables that can be used to project their evolution forward.
11.  See Wilmoth (2005) for discussion of mortality rates, their history, and their 
role in population projections.
12. The risks to the immigration assumptions are essentially risks to the net 
immigration of Hispanics. As Figure 2.7 shows, Hispanic males in the United 
States have high labor force participation rates, but the same does not apply to 
Hispanic females.
13.  For more discussion see Passel (2006). Jeffrey S., “Size and Characteristics of 
the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S.,” Pew Hispanic Center, 2006.
14.  Here we assume that the immigrants would have the same participation rate 
as the general population.
15. The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that net undocumented immigration in 
2006 was 500,000. The addition of 200,000 more immigrants per year would 
imply a large margin of error to existing estimates. However, we recognize that 
estimating the ﬂ   ow of undocumented immigrants likely has wide conﬁ  dence 
intervals.
16.  See Fallick and Pingle (2007). 
17. Discussion of the Bureau of Labor Statistics projections can be found in 
Chapter 13 of the 2007 edition of the Bureau of Labor Statistics Handbook of 
Methods. This is available at http://www.bls.gov/opub/hom/homtoc.htm. The 
Social Security Administration projections are discussed in the Trustees Report, 
available on-line at http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR07/index.html. For more 
information on the estimation of Social Security Administration participation 
rates, see the Technical Panel on Assumptions and Methods (2003).
18.  This offset refers to only one aspect of the inﬂ  uence of this age group, as the 
growth in the population share of these age groups with participation rates well 
below average are an important part of the downward pressure on labor force 
participation resulting from population aging.
19.  Although the data from the 2007 Trustees Report was released too late to be 
incorporated into this paper, one correction made to the Social Security Admin-
istration projections was to revise downward the forecasts for various groups of 
prime-age women. For example, the future projection for females aged 45–54 
years in 2016 was revised from 74.2 percent to 73.9 percent.The Outlook for Labor Supply in the United States 62
20.  For discussion of this decline, see Aaronson, Park, and Sullivan (2006).
21.  This is easily veriﬁ  ed using the Bureau of Labor Statistics data series from the 
basic monthly Current Population Survey.
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Chinhui Juhn
After nearly four decades of growth, the U.S. labor force now faces the 
prospect of two negative blows—the retirement of the baby boom cohort 
and the cessation and possibly the reversal of female labor supply growth. 
Fallick and Pingle show that if age-speciﬁ  c participation rates remain at 
today’s rates, the aging of the U.S. population could potentially offset 
the entire growth in the aggregate labor force participation rate we have 
witnessed since the mid-1960s. While there are some debatable issues 
regarding their exact calculation of population shares—such as projec-
tion of mortality rates and future immigrant inﬂ  ows—the key question 
stemming from their analysis that I will focus on is: will future age-speciﬁ  c 
labor force participation rates will remain at today’s levels? In particular, 
there are two critical groups—the older adult populations (those aged 65 
years and over, and those at 55–64 years of age nearing retirement) and 
prime-age women between the ages of 25–54 years. Will the baby boom 
cohorts work longer relative to previous cohorts? Has the labor force 
participation rate of married U.S. women not only stopped climbing, 
but are there signs in the last decade that the trend has actually 
reversed?
On the question of older Americans, models by Fallick and Pingle and 
two government agencies, the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and the 
Social Security Administration (SSA) are in agreement and their collec-
tive outlook is fairly positive—that is, if having older Americans work 
longer is the goal. The authors list several factors that, going forward, 
seem to predict rising labor force participation rates for older groups. 
Among these factors are longer life expectancies and hence longer retire-The Outlook for Labor Supply in the United States 66
Table 2.2
Husband’s Labor Force Participation as Function of Wife’s Participation
All Years: 1968–2006
  Wife in the LF
  Number of Children <=18
 Observed  Probability
Recent Years: 1996–2006
  Wife in the LF
  Number of Children <=18

































25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+
Source: March Current Population Survey 1968–2006. The sample includes mar-
ried men who are 25 and older. The above reports the marginal effects from 
probit regressions with husband’s probability of being in the labor force as the 
dependent variable. The regression also included husband’s age, husband’s and 
wife’s education dummies, and year and state ﬁ  xed effects.
ment periods that need to be ﬁ  nanced, better health, increases in educa-
tion, and changes in the Social Security program that reduce the incentive 
to retire early. I would like to mention two other contingent factors. The 
ﬁ  rst is the possibility that the increased labor force attachment of women 
is not only likely to increase participation among the women themselves 
at older ages, but also their husbands’ participation rates, given the 
often-found complementarity in spouses’ retirement behavior. Table 2.2 
shows how for different age groups, a husband’s labor force participa-
tion is related to his wife’s labor force participation. The marginal effects 
reported in the ﬁ  rst row of the top panel show that a wife’s participation 
in the labor force increases her husband’s participation, and this com-
plementary/mutually reinforcing effect rises steeply with age. For men 
aged 55–64 years, having a wife who is in the labor force increases the 
husband’s participation probability by 12.5 percentage points. At age 65 
years and over, the marginal effect is 22.3 percentage points. While the 
table to some degree reﬂ  ects positive assortative mating, the increasing 
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positive association over the life cycle most likely reﬂ  ects the comple-
mentarity of time spent at home for retired spouses. The bottom panel 
shows that this effect has in fact become more pronounced in the last ten 
years, 1996–2006, with the marginal effect for 55-64-year-old men rising 
to 16.7 percentage points. Of course these numbers all refer to married 
men. For this 55-64-year-old age category, the availability of disability 
beneﬁ  ts, together with lackluster demand for less-skilled workers, will 
likely continue to put downward pressure on the participation rates of 
less-skilled unmarried men in this age group.
Another factor not mentioned by Fallick and Pingle, but likely to 
become important in the next several decades, is the decline in employer-
provided health insurance for retired workers. Between 1988 and 2005, 
the share of large ﬁ  rms (those having 200 or more employees) offering 
health insurance to their active employees and also offering health insur-
ance to their retired employees declined precipitously from 66 percent to 
33 percent. Current retirees and near-retirees may be grandfathered into 
employer-provided retirement health plans, so that we may not see much 
change in coverage rates in recent years. However, successive cohorts of 
retirees are surely less likely to receive such generous health beneﬁ  ts from 
their former employers. This decline in retiree health coverage could be 
another factor that boosts the labor force participation rate of 55-64-
year-olds.
Let me now turn to prime-age women, those in the 25-54-year-old age 
group. The authors’ forecast of these women’s labor force participation 
differs considerably from the forecasts made by other government agen-
cies. As illustrated in their Figure 2.12, by the year 2015 there is almost 
a 3 percentage point difference between the Fallick and Pingle forecast 
and the other forecasts. Yet the behavior of women has in the past proven 
to be notoriously difﬁ  cult to forecast. I doubt that anyone in the 1950s 
or 1960s would have accurately forecasted the acceleration in married 
women’s labor force participation during the 1970s and the 1980s. The 
point is, this exercise in forecasting the future is largely a guessing game. 
However, the authors’ projections of the decline in the participation rate 
of prime-aged women is, in my view, overly pessimistic. First, while the 
rise in participation of married women has deﬁ  nitely come to a stop, I The Outlook for Labor Supply in the United States 68
do not see evidence of an actually declining trend. Second, I have some 
reservations about the authors’ cohort-based approach.
Table 2.3 examines the labor force participation rate of prime-age 
women using the March Current Population Survey. The columns report 
three-year averages centered on the indicated years. As shown in the top 
row of the table, participation between 1980 and 1990 rose rapidly by 
nearly 10 percentage points in this decade. Since 1995, however, prime-
age women’s labor force participation has remained virtually constant, 
which suggests that the factors that lead to the rapid rise in the earlier 
Table 2.3
Labor Force Participation Rates of Prime-Age Women
Year
1980 1990 1995 2000 2005
Unemployment Rate
Women, Aged 25-54 Years Old
A. Marital  Status 
A.  All Married
A.  Widowed/Divorced
A.  Never Married
 
B. Mothers  vs.  Non-Mothers1
A.  Mothers 
A.  Non-Mothers
C.  Young College Mothers vs. Never Married College Women2
A.  Young College Mothers



















































Source: March Current Population Survey micro data. The numbers in the col-
umns refer to three-year averages centered on the indicated years. 
1“Mothers” are deﬁ  ned as women with at least one child of their own who is 
aged 18 years or younger, never married, and living in the household. 
2“Young College Mothers” refers to white married mothers aged 25–34 with a 
college degree while “Never Married College Women” refers to never married 
white women aged 40–49 with a college degree.
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decades had largely played out by the mid-1990s. Their participation rate 
did rise from 1995 to 2000. However, the higher participation rate most 
likely reﬂ  ected favorable cyclical conditions, as the aggregate unemploy-
ment rate in 2000 was at the lowest level since the late 1960s. During the 
latter half of the 1990s, welfare reform and the expansion of the Earned 
Income Tax Credit (EITC) also spurred strong employment growth among 
less-educated women. Since 2000, prime-age women’s participation rate 
fell 2.1 percentage points. Despite articles in the popular press proclaim-
ing that mothers are “opting out” of the U.S. labor force, participation 
rates fell by a smaller amount among married women than never-mar-
ried women—1.8 percentage points versus 2.7 percentage points. Par-
ticipation among mothers fell 1.9 percentage points, while participation 
fell 2.2 percentage points among non-mothers. In other words, when we 
take into account the weaker labor market conditions in the early 2000s 
by comparing the labor market behavior of married women against the 
behavior of non-married women, there is little evidence that the trend 
among married mothers—the group that fueled the increases in the ear-
lier decades—has actually reversed and begun to decline. 
Let me now turn to my reservations about the authors’ cohort-based 
approach. Fallick and Pingle rely on a cohort-based model in which they 
assume a constant age proﬁ  le and permanent cohort effects. This is an 
especially hazardous exercise for predicting women’s behavior, since 
every birth cohort of women has a unique proﬁ  le of labor force participa-
tion. The authors also use time-varying variables such as life expectancy, 
fertility, and the marriage rate as explanatory variables in their model. 
The problem is that in a reduced-form model, the coefﬁ  cients are unlikely 
to be stable over time. To make this point, Figure 2.17 shows trends in 
U.S. women’s labor force participation rates and marriage patterns—the 
percent “ever married” at age 25–29. The ﬁ  gure is arranged by birth 
cohort. Using only the earlier part of the data, we would end up with 
a large negative coefﬁ  cient and would over-predict participation rates 
for the more recent birth cohorts based on marriage patterns, thereby 
estimating negative cohort effects. It is not clear that using information 
on previous cohorts leads to better predictions than are obtained by sim-





















































































































































































































































































































































































and Pingle make an important point and demonstrate an undeniable fact 
that the aging of the U.S. labor force will put downward pressures on 
the aggregate labor force participation rate. However, in my view their 
projections of the within-group participation rates, particularly those of 
prime-aged women, are more conjectural and overly pessimistic than is 
warranted by a fuller examination of the data.
Finally, I would like to take a step back to look at the bigger picture. 
We are worried about the impact of aging and other labor force trends 
on potential economic growth in the United States. But in addressing this 
topic, we have ignored some important issues. So far we treated labor as 
homogenous in skill, and we have not made a distinction between shifts in 
demand and supply. Clearly the aging of the American labor force entails 
an inward shift in the aggregate labor supply curve, since older workers 
are less inclined to work than younger workers at the same wage. With 
regards to the decline in the labor force participation of prime-aged men, 
however, evidence points toward declining demand for their services. In 
view of the lackluster performance of recent wage growth, with the excep-
tion of the very top of the wage distribution, it seems not so much the lack 
of available working age men that is the problem. In fact, there appear 
to be too many men who are not very productive and employable. We 
may have a labor “supply” problem of sorts, but it is more of the “skills-
mismatch”variety rather than simply the shortage of workers per se.
Notes
1. I draw here from a recent paper by Schirle (2007) and my own paper with 
Simon Potter (2007).
2.  Kaisier Family Foundation and Health Research and Educational Trust (2005), 
also reported in Strumpf (2006).
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Comments on “The Effect of Population 
Aging on Aggregate Labor Supply in the 
United States” by Bruce Fallick and 
Jonathan Pingle
Lisa M. Lynch
Bruce Fallick and Jonathon Pingle have written a thought-provoking 
paper that helps set the stage for our discussion on labor supply in the 
twenty-ﬁ  rst century. The paper carefully documents how—conditional 
on no changes in the participation behavior of workers, especially older 
workers—current projections of population aging will imply a decrease 
in the aggregate labor force participation rate in the United States of 6 
full percentage points over the next 35 years. This is a huge change with 
signiﬁ  cant implications for our forecasts of potential aggregate output 
and consequently for our conduct of monetary policy. However, before 
we panic too much over this large projected decrease in the aggregate 
labor force participation rate, there are a few caveats to keep in mind. 
First, making predictions about what might happen in 35 years time, 
let alone 20 or even ﬁ  ve years in the future, is a hazardous business. If 
35 years ago we had used the 1972 labor force participation rates by 
gender and age, and had allowed the population shares to evolve as then 
forecast by the Census Bureau, it is doubtful that we would have come 
close to mapping the marked rise in labor force participation rates that 
the authors show in their Figure 2.3. Second, potential output is driven 
not only by labor force participation rates, but also by human capital and 
the quality of labor. Declines in labor force participation rates may not be 
as much of a concern in a context of rising labor productivity. Therefore, 
investments in education and training, along with investments in physical 
capital, will also play a critical role for future potential output growth.
Nevertheless, understanding the potential impact of an aging work-
force is important for policymakers. The paper begins by providing a 
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ment projections for the U.S. population over the next 35 years. Particu-
larly important is the discussion, as illustrated in the authors’ Figure 2.8, 
of the impact on the projected path of labor force participation rates by 
adding 100,000–200,000 net new immigrants annually in the coming 
years to the 30-34-year-old male age group. Fallick and Pingle argue that 
even such a large increase to the U.S. working-age population could not 
reverse the underlying downward pressures on the projected labor force 
participation rate over the next 35 years, everything else staying constant. 
This is a very important simulation and one that is not that far removed 
from possible reforms of immigration policy in the United States. The 
Congressional Budget Ofﬁ  ce1 recently released a report concluding that 
proposed immigration legislation in 2007 would increase the U.S. popu-
lation by 1.8 million people in ten years time; this estimate translates into 
adding approximately new 180,000 workers a year. 
Although Fallick and Pingle explain why even fairly large changes in 
U.S. immigration policy will have a limited impact on labor force partici-
pation rates, it is important to note that such increases would increase 
the overall supply of labor in the United States. In addition, their simu-
lations assume that labor force participation rates for immigrants will 
be the same as for native-born American men in the age class of 30–34 
years. However, we know from the Bureau of Labor Statistics that labor 
force participation rates for foreign-born males are much higher than for 
native-born males—almost 82 percent versus 72 percent for native-born 
workers.2 Finally, an important component of recently proposed immi-
gration legislation is a reconsideration of the relative priority placed on 
family uniﬁ  cation versus speciﬁ  c professional skills for immigration pol-
icy. This potential policy change poses signiﬁ  cant implications for future 
labor productivity in the United States. If we shift our immigration policy 
toward one that gives more weight to admitting more highly skilled peo-
ple, we may not adjust the labor force participation rates signiﬁ  cantly, 
but this shift would have an impact on labor productivity. So the ultimate 
impact on our economy of a change in immigration policy is not only on 
the number of people participating in the labor force, but also encom-
passes the human capital that is embodied in these individuals. 
The paper then turns to the projections of within-age group participa-
tion rates. There are two critical parts to this discussion—what is going 
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to happen to older workers’ labor force participation rates, and what is 
going to happen to the labor force participation rates of men and women 
aged 25-54-years-old. In terms of older workers, we have seen a steady 
increase in the labor force participation rate of male workers over the 
age of 55 since the mid-1990s. I would argue, as do Munnell and Sass 
in their conference paper, that this increase has been fueled in part by 
declines in employer-provided healthcare for retirees, changes in Ameri-
cans’ retirement ﬁ  nancial security due to improved health and changes in 
the composition of pension assets, changing occupational characteristics 
of workers, rising educational levels, and technologies that make work-
ing from home easier. Forecasting just how much more labor force par-
ticipation rates might increase for this older age group is challenging but 
Fallick and Pingle, the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the Social Security 
Administration all seem to agree that this participation rate will continue 
to rise in the near future.
However, there is much less consensus on what is going to happen to 
labor force participation rates of workers aged 25–54 years.  Using pro-
jections from a model that relies on cohort effects to predict the future 
path of participation of individual birth years, Fallick and Pingle expect 
that labor force participation rates for prime working-age males will 
continue to decline, a pattern seen over the past 30 years. This predic-
tion begs the question of why the participation rate for prime-age male 
workers has been falling. Without a better understanding of why labor 
supply for this group has been declining, it is difﬁ  cult to assess whether 
or not extrapolating that trend forward makes sense or not. Changes 
in the generosity of disability insurance, incarceration rates, and school 
enrollment patterns may all be playing a role here. In a technical back-
ground paper associated with this conference paper, Fallick and Pingle 
(2007) present more details on the model they use to predict the future 
path of labor force participation. Speciﬁ  cally, in an enhanced model they 
show how controlling for schooling, along with age and cohort effects, is 
important for explaining past trends in male labor supply. However, they 
do not include controls for disability eligibility, changes in replacement 
rates associated with disability insurance, or incarceration rates. Those 
men in prison are not included in the numerator or denominator of the 
civilian labor force participation rate, so in principal changes in the U.S. The Outlook for Labor Supply in the United States 76
male prison population are irrelevant for male labor force projections. 
However, if we assume that incarceration rates are positively correlated 
with the pool of potential criminals, and we assume that potential crimi-
nals have a lower labor force participation rate, as suggested in work by 
Western, Kling, and Weiman (2001), then controlling for this variable/
effect might be useful. In terms of the potential impact of enhanced dis-
ability insurance on labor force participation, we know from the work by 
Autor and Duggan (2003) that among males aged 25–54 years, receipts 
of disability insurance rose by 50 percent between 1984 and 1999. The 
increase was even more dramatic for those men without a high school 
diploma. While Fallick and Pingle have tried including the fraction of 
applications for disability insurance approved in each year in their model 
of labor force participation, they omit this variable due to its limited 
explanatory power. However, other proxy measures, such as the disabil-
ity insurance replacement rate for low-skilled workers or the disability 
insurance application rate per capita, might provide more explanatory 
power. 
The largest point of departure in the labor force projections generated 
by the Fallick and Pingle model versus those provided by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and the Social Security Administration has to do with the 
projected 25–54 year-old female labor force participation rate. Fallick 
and Pingle predict that the leveling off in female labor force participation 
that we have seen over the last couple of years will actually start trending 
down since, “women have begun to behave similarly to prime-age men.” 
In large part, their claim is driven by trends in labor force participation 
rates that they observe for women born after 1950 when they reach the 
ages of 35–44 years. I want to suggest a couple of reasons why you might 
want to question the projections for this group that come out of Fallick 
and Pingle’s model. 
First, let me just state the obvious: since the level of women’s labor 
force participation is not equal to men’s, it is does not follow that the rate 
of change should exhibit the same pattern as men’s. Second, Fallick and 
Pingle argue that more recent cohorts of women seem less attached to the 
labor market than past cohorts. However, in their technical background 
paper, the authors state that they drop the eight birth-year cohorts who 
entered the labor market after 1996 due to small sample sizes. I would 
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suggest that more recent cohorts are unlikely to be similar to previous 
cohorts simply on the basis of the educational choices they have been 
making. In Figure 2.18 we see that college enrollment rates for males and 
females have been trending steadily upwards since 1973, especially for 
women. But since the early 1990s, women have been behaving differently 
than men and enrolling at a higher rate in four-year colleges. The more 
recent cohorts of women are clearly exhibiting a greater taste for invest-
ment in higher education. This difference may actually mean that going 
forward, we will see a further divergence in the labor supply behavior 
of American men and women that reﬂ  ects these different educational 
choices.
The role of technology is another issue that I think is quite important, 
but that has not been addressed in any of the papers presented here. 
Technology has had a profound impact on the labor supply of successive 
cohorts of women during the twentieth century. Improvements in mater-
nal health and the availability of infant formula, as discussed by Albanesi 
and Olivetti (2007), meant that women who were born in the early part 
of the twentieth century spent much less time engaged in the production 
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of children. This in turn allowed them to have more time to be active 
in the labor market. The introduction of labor-saving devices that freed 
women from certain household chores and the introduction of the Pill 
affected subsequent cohorts of women and their labor supply decisions. 
Those women born after 1950 have experienced yet another techno-
logical innovation—fertility-enhancing reproductive technologies. These 
innovations started becoming available during the mid–1980s, when 
those born in 1950 were moving into the age range of 35–44 years, and 
insurance coverage for these  treatments gradually expanded through the 
1990s. These reproductive technologies have had a dramatic impact on 
birth rates by age of the mother, as shown in Figure 2.19. For example, 
if we compare the birth rates for women aged 35–39 years in 1980 and 
in 2005, we see that these rates have more than doubled. At the same 
time, teenage birth rates and birth rates for women aged 20–24 years 
have been declining. As women defer childbearing to later years, it is not 
clear whether or not the tapering off or decline in labor force participa-
tion we see in women aged 35–44 years will then reverse itself as they 
Figure 2.19 
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get older. Fallick and Pingle try to address the impact of fertility in their 
extended model by including controls for fertility. However, they only do 
this for women aged 18–29 years. This means that they have not been 
able to incorporate into their projections how this technological shock 
may affect labor market decisions of older women. Older women who 
may have withdrawn from the labor market to take care of young chil-
dren may exhibit very different re-entry patterns into the labor market 
than those who had children at a much younger age.
Finally, the aging of the U.S. working population will also have an 
impact on labor productivity. As workers age, they amass more experi-
ence and, depending on the amount of skills investment they have received 
on the job, they may also have higher human capital. These higher expe-
rience levels should, in turn, raise labor productivity. Unfortunately the 
failure of U.S. statistical agencies to systematically collect information on 
how people acquire skills in the workplace as they age limits our under-
standing of how declines in labor force participation may be offset by 
post-school investments in human capital. 
In conclusion, if we have learned anything about the baby boom gen-
eration, it is that they have deﬁ  ed all efforts by demographers and econo-
mists to pigeonhole their labor market behavior. As they age, the boomers 
will continue to redeﬁ  ne hours of work, conditions of work, and where 
work is conducted. As a result, our efforts to try to model their labor 
market behavior going forward will constantly be challenged. 
Notes
1. Congressional  Budget  Ofﬁ  ce, Cost Estimate. 2007. “Senate Amendment 1150 
to S. 1348, the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007.” Available 
online at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/81xx/doc8179/SA1150_June4.pdf.
2.  Bureau of Labor Statistics. 2007. “Foreign-Born Workers: Labor Force Char-
acteristics in 2006,” released April 25. Available online at http://www.bls.gov/
news.release/pdf/forbrn.pdf.
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